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Should Ve Vorry !bout The Fiscal Numerology of Iaastricht?

Abstract.

The paper reviews and evaluates in a non-technical manner the economic
and political arguments for and against the two fiscal -convergence criteria
written into the Treaty of Maastricht and its Protocols.

In order to qualify

for full membership in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) net general
government borrowing may not exceed three percent of GDP and general
government gross debt may not exceed sixty percent of GDP.

The paper

concludes that the adoption of the two universal fiscal reference values is
arbitrary, that is without theoretical or practical foundation.

It reflects

the triumph of central bank (especially Bundesbank) fiscal-political dogma
over economic reasoning and common sense.

Attempts to meet these fiscal norms

would result in unnecessary hardship for a number of countries and in a
deflationary fiscal stance for the EC as a whole.

JEL Classification Numbers: 431, 432, 423, 320, 325.

Keywords: EMU; convergence; public debt and deficits; coordination;

externalities; political economy.
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(1) Introduction.

The beast may only have one number, 666, Maastricht has two, 3 and 60.
The Treaty of Maastricht and the protocols attached to it contain a number of
convergence criteria that must be satisfied by member states in order to
qualify for full membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

This

paper analyses the two quantitative criteria for avoiding and correcting
"excessive government deficits".
sector may be no higher than
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Net borrowing by the general government

percent of GDP and general government gross

debt may not exceed 60 percent of GDP.

By comparison, the Dutch government

had a deficit of 4.4 percent of GDP in 1991 and its gross debt at the end of
1991 is estimated at 78.4 percent of GDP.

Table 1 shows the situation for all

twelve EC member states in 1991.
Table 1
General Government Debts and Deficits in the EC, 1991.
General Govel"DDlent
Gross Debt
%GDP

Germany
France
Italy
U.K.
Belgium
Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Netherlands
Spain
Portugal
Luxembourg
EC Average
*West Germany, 1990.
** 1990
Source: EC

43.6 *
47.2

General Goverm1ent
Net Borrowing
%GDP
1.9*
1.5

101.2

9.9

43.8
129.4
66.7
96.4
102.8

1.9
6.4
1. 7

78.4

45.6
61.6

6.9
60.3 **

17.9
4.1
4.4
3.9
5.4
-1.9

4.1 **
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It is apparent from Table 1 that only France, the UK and Luxembourg win
for Europe on both fronts (in Germany the government deficit for 1991 will
almost certainly be higher than 3 %of GDP).
The two hard quantitative norms are to some extent qualified, softened
and rendered fuzzy by the surrounding text.

If the deficit is above its

reference value, here need be no cause for alarm as long as the deficit-GDP
ratio has declined substantially and continuously and does not exceed the
reference value by too much on the proposed accession date.

Exceptional and

temporary excesses of the actual over the reference ratio are also permitted.
If the debt-GDP ratio is too high, there will be sanctions only if the ratio
is not sufficiently diminishing and not approaching the reference value at a
satisfactory pace (it does not say for whom the pace should be satisfactory).
Policy makers may allow for the relationship between the government deficit
and government investment, and indeed for all other relevant factors,
including the medium-term economic and budgetary position of the member state.
Vhen a member state fails to comply with the recommendations of the
Council of Ministers, a number of sanctions may be invoked.

The European

Investment Bank may be invited to reconsider its lending policy to the member
state.

The member state may be required to make a non interest-bearing

deposit with the Community.

Fines may be imposed.

Vhen a member state is in

the fiscal dog house, it may not vote in the Council of Ministers on issues
related to EMU (except presumably on issues such as the exchange rate regime
between its own currency, which will perforce continue to exist, and the ECU,
the common currency of the full EMU members).

It will not be able to appoint

representatives to the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) or
to its Executive Board.
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(2) Where do these reference values come from?

Vb.ere do these two fiscal criteria come from? As regards the debt-GDP
reference value, one "explanation" is that 60 percent of GDP is approximately
the average value of this ratio for the twelve Community members in 1990-91.
This is not true for the deficit-GDP reference value.
during 1990 was 4.1 percent of GDP.

Its average value

In 1991 it will also be significantly

above the reference value of 3 percent. 1
With a bit of goodwill, the two reference values can be said to be

compatible with a stationary long-run equilibrium, based upon the status quo
of the (mythical) average EC member. For instance, without monetary financing
and with a growth rate of real GDP of

3

percent per annum and an inflation

rate of 2 percent per annum, the reference values of 60 percent and 3 percent
are consistent with a stationary equilibrium.2
It should be obvious (but unfortunately does not appear to be so) that
elevating these reference values (or indeed any reference values) to
international norms or standards is unadulterated economic nonsense, and
dangerous nonsense to boot. The average current value of the debt-GDP ratio
or the average-current-value-minus-a-bit of the deficit-GDP ratio have no
normative significance whatsoever. With equal (lack of) justification one
could have chosen the numbers 12 (the number of the apostles) and 42 (the
answer to the question about life, the universe and everything3).

At the risk

of belaboring the obvious, I briefly review fourteen economic arguments.
(1) The debt criterion is defined in terms of the nominal or face value
of gross rather than of net government debt.

Government assets therefore are

not counted, not even financial assets and other quite readily marketable,
liquid assets. There is no good reason for taking so restrictive a view of
the government balance sheet4.

In the Netherlands, government assets such as
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those accumulated by the ABP (Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds) to fund
future civil service pensions are sufficient to bring net government debt down
to less than 60 percent of GDP. Not counting such public sector assets biases
the comparison of the Netherlands, where civil service pensions are funded,
with countries that pay for civil service pensions using an unfunded scheme.

Table 2 shows that the differences between net and gross debt can be sizable.

Table 2.
EC General Government Gross and Net Debt, in 1990.

Germany
France
Italy
U.K.
Belgium
Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Netherlands
Spain
Portugal
Luxembourg

Gross Debt
%GDP
(EC)
(OECD)
43.6 * 43.9
46.6
47.1
98.6 103.8
42.8
36.7
127.3 131.5
66.4
59.6
93.7
85.2
103.0 113.0
78.3
79.8
44.5
45.3
NA
68.2
NA
7.3

Net Debt
%GDP
(OECD)
24.1
25.4
100.9
30.0
121.3
27.3

NA
NA

59.3
32.7

NA
NA

*Vest Germany.

** On a SNA basis except for the UK and Greece where the data are based on
national methods.
Sources: EC and OECD Economic Outlook.
(2) By elevating the European average of the debt-GDP ratios and a number
below the European average of the deficit-GDP ratios to the status of
one-sided or asymmetric norms (values above the norm are not permitted, values
below the norm are), fiscal policy in the EC will subject to a contractionary
bias during the next few years. There is no mention in the Treaty of the need
for a less restrictive average stance of monetary policy to compensate for

I
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this deflationary fiscal bias.
(3) The automatic fiscal stabilizers ensure that the government deficit
rises in a slump and falls during a boom. According to the Maastricht Treaty
and protocols, cyclical variations in the government deficit centered on the
reference value of 3 percent would not be permitted, since cyclical excesses
of the actual deficit over the reference value would be temporary but
certainly not exceptional.

In order not to exceed the 3 percent ceiling on a

regular basis, the deficit will have to cycle around an average value of less
than 3 percent of GDP.

This reinforces the contractionary bias of the deficit

norm during the transitional period.
(4) For those who favor a Keynesian approach to the determination of the
level of economic activity, the average monetary-fiscal policy "mix" for the
Community as a whole (in relation to the mixes in North America and Japan) are
a concern. Maastricht is silent on this issue.
(5) The Treaty refers, without mentioning it by name, to the "golden
rule" of government financing: balance the current budget and borrow no more
than the amount of capital formation.

The German negotiators were especially

keen on this "rule for virtuous borrowing". The practical problems associated
with any attempt to distinguish consumption spending from investment are well
known.

"Current" expenditures on education, such as teachers salaries are an

obvious example.

Even if that problem has been overcome, the "golden rule"

for government financing makes no sense and can lead to bad policy choices.
First, there is nothing wrong with borrowing to finance consumption
expenditures, even if we ignore possible Keynesian benefits in economies with
widespread capacity under utilization.

As long as the borrower realizes that

ceteris paribus future consumption will have to decline in present value by as
much as current consumption increases, there is no prima facie reason to
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second guess his intertemporal choices.

One of the most important papers in

the post World War II economics literature (Samuelson [1958]) introduced the
consumption-loan model; this in now at the center of most interesting dynamic
macroeconomic modeling.

Consumption smoothing when income is variable and/or

uncertain is optimal according to the permanent income-life cycle hypothesis.
The bias against consumption loans by the government that underlies the
golden rule of government finance is an example of what in Britain used to be
called the Treasury view, but should today be called central bank economic
ideology.

Central bankers, whose Weltanschauung permeates and dominates the

sections of the Treaty dealing with EMU, tend to possess a paternalistic
puritan streak that compels them to exhort others to choose consumption
tomorrow over consumption today.

In my view, such personal or group

idiosyncrasies should not be allowed to interfere with the free expression of
private and public intertemporal choices, unless they are backed up with a
convincing demonstration that major market failure has resulted in saving
rates lower than the social optimum.
Second, many socially useful and desirable government investment projects
do not, either directly (say, through user fees) or indirectly (say, by
boosting the tax base) increase the future balance of receipts over
non-interest expenditures by an amount at least equal in present discounted
value to the cost of the projects.

In that case financing by borrowing must

sooner or later be supplemented by policies to raise revenues or cut
non-interest expenditures.

The social rate of return on a government

investment project need bear no relation to its effect on the government's
future cash flow 5 • To the extent that the government does not appropriate
(directly or indirectly) the returns to public sector investment, the "golden
rule" of public sector financing may be an recipe for weakening the public
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sector balance sheet that can ultimately lead to insolvency. Therefore,
government investment can be financed safely through borrowing only if this
investment will in the future reduce the primary government deficits by enough
to compensate for the higher interest payments associated with the borrowing.
(6) The neoclassical theory of the optimal use of distortionary taxes
suggests that temporary (exogenous) increases in expenditures and temporary
(exogenous) reductions in the tax base should be reflected in temporary
government deficits and permanently higher tax rates.

A simple special case

of this theory implies that under the optimal tax rule the public debt will
follow a "random walk"

6,

This means that the optimally chosen value of the

public debt will, in due course, exceed or fall below any imaginable value, no
matter how high or low. The number 60 (or any other number) does not have
special significance in this approach (see e.g. Barro [1979]).
The strict random walk result relies on very restrictive assumptions and
It has been referred to only to underline that

should not be taken seriously.

even those approaches to positive economics and to economic policy design that
are furthest removed from the Keynesian paradigm, can come up with
prescriptions for the behavior of public debt and deficits that are orthogonal
to the Maastricht rules.
(7) Countries with a higher growth rate of real GDP can ceteris paribus
safely support a higher deficit-GDP ratio.

Do the authors of the Maastricht

Treaty assume that henceforth all member states will have the same growth
rates of real GDP?
(8) The same holds in principle for countries with a higher rate of
inflation.

Ve can expect that, if and when the member states of the EC have a

common currency, there will be no sizable permanent national or regional
differences in inflation rates

7

Until we get to that point, however, there

8

are likely to be differences.

The inflation convergence criterion permits

inflation up to 1.5 percent per annum higher (during the year before EMU
judgment day) than the average of the three countries with the lowest rate of
inflation s.
lore generally, it is strange that the government deficit norm makes no
allowance for the distinction between nominal and real interest rates on the
public debt.
(9) There is no apparent relationship between the two budgetary norms and
the criteria commonly used by economists to evaluate the solvency of the
government.

The government is said to be solvent if the nominal or face value

of the public debt held outside the central bank is no greater than the
present discounted value of the future expected primary government surpluses
plus the present discounted value of the future expected increases in credit
extended to the government by the central bank (see e.g. Buiter [1983]).

An

equivalent solvency criterion is that the present discounted value of
government debt very far in the future will ultimately be non-positive
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There is no relationship between these solvency criteria and the debt or
deficit norms of laastricht.
(10) One often hears references to so-called "external effects" of
government budget deficits (see e.g. the clear discussion in Bovenberg et. al.
[1991] and the much less clear discussion in Commission of the European
Communities [1991]).

If, for instance, the German government finances its

deficit in the capital markets, this will ceteris paribus raise real interest
rates in Germany and in all countries tied to Germany through efficient
capital markets

1 0.

From this premise, which is non-controversial (unless one

is a believer in Ricardian equivalence) it is then inferred quite
illegitimately, that such negative external effects must be opposed and, if
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possible, avoided altogether.

Both the designation "external effects" and the

characterization "negative" reflect sloppy thinking.
When I increase my purchases of bananas in a competitive market with an
upward-sloping banana supply schedule, the price of bananas will rise.

This

is good news for all those who are long in bananas (net banana exporters) and
bad news for all those who are short in bananas (net banana importers). The
increase in the price of bananas is exactly what ought to happen if the market
system is to do its job of allocating resources efficiently.

The price

increase inflicted by me on other banana buyers and sellers is what economists
call a pecuniary externality.

It is to be distinguished sharply from

technological externalities, effects of one agent's actions on the

consumptions sets, utility functions or production functions of other agents
for which no appropriate price is charged. In complete competitive markets,
no adverse efficiency consequences are associated with pecuniary
externalities.

They are merely another word for general market

interdependence. As is clear from the banana example, the price changes will
have distributional consequences.

If these are undesirable, policy makers are

free to do something about that with the most effective redistribution
instruments at their disposal.
What is true for bananas is also true for government debt.

When a

government finances a deficit in the capital markets and interest rates rise,
this is good news for creditors everywhere and bad news for debtors
everywhere 11 •

If this form of redistribution is undesirable, governments are

free to respond appropriately.

It is extremely unlikely, that the best way to

achieve the desired redistribution is by forbidding budget deficits above a
certain level.

Note that it is also quite irrelevant whether the deficits

under consideration finance public consumption or productive public
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investment.
There are theoretical arguments for the international coordination of
virtually every aspect of budgetary policy, with the exception of government
deficits and government debt.

Public consumption and investment may have

technological external effects that render coordination desirable in principle
(the practical problems of productive international coordination are an
important subject in their own right, which cannot be addressed here).

It is

also well-know that the uncoordinated setting of national distortionary
taxes, transfers and subsidies can lead to Pareto-inefficient outcomes, that
is outcomes that are inferior for all parties involved to some other
technically feasible outcome. The examples of international tax competition,
of national subsidy races and of the competitive dismantling of national
welfare systems in order to attract foreign direct investment come to mind.
Vith government borrowing things are different.

There already is an

international coordination mechanism, the international financial markets.
Vhy does Brussels insist on encumbering with international quantitative norms
the one corner of budgetary policy where there is no case for international
coordination? The much-vaunted principle of subsidiarity has been trampled
quite blatantly.
Of course, national governments can, as part of their macroeconomic
planning procedures, specify intermediate targets and hard or soft rules and
norms for their entire fiscal instrumentarium, including the tax burden,
marginal tax, transfer and subsidy rates, public consumption and investment,
government deficits, government debt and monetary growth.

Such intermediate

targets, norms and rules should prescribe (or proscribe) actions at a
particular time, in a particular place and given a particular state of nature.
They should be contingent or conditional.

One would therefore not expect to

11

find them written into a national constitution or international treaty as a
set of fixed numbers.

Moreover, as regards government deficits or debt, there

is no efficiency case for international coordination of national targets,
norms or rules.

That is what we have international financial markets for.

(11) Another assertion one hears quite frequently is that with a fixed
exchange rate (and a fortiori with a common currency), national governments
that issue debt denominated in the common currency will not be subject to
effective discipline and restraint by the financial markets.

This argument

has very little going for it.
Assume that EMU is a fact and that a common currency (the ECU) has been
adopted.

If for instance the German government, unwilling to face paying the

price of German unification, were to continue with the issuing of massive
amounts of debt (now denominated in ECUs), it would in due course have to pay
a growing sovereign risk premium in its ECU interest rate.

In addition, and

more important in practice, it would sooner or later encounter credit
rationing.

It would be unable to sell debt in any currency and at any rate of

interest.
The disappearance of the national currency implies that exchange rate
risk disappears as a source of national interest differentials.

Other forms

of risk (especially sovereign default risk) will continue to be priced in the
market and to be reflected in quantitative constraints on borrowing.
For the proper functioning of the national and international credit
markets it is necessary that the member states of the EMU (and the
supranational organs of the Community) make it absolutely clear and credible,
that national debt is and remains the exclusive obligation and responsibility
of the national government in question and of those who, now or in the future,
pay taxes to this government

12.

The same is of course true without EMU and
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without a common currency.

Whether or not such a commitment against debt bail

outs can be made credible is a practical political issue.
that this is not difficult in practice.

Experience shows

For instance, in the US this has long

been the case for the debt of individual states and of local government units.
I see no reason to believe that intra-Community international solidarity
will be strengthened by EMU, or that EMU will strengthen the bargaining power
of debtor governments vis-a-vis creditor governments. What, after all, can
post-EMU debtor governments threaten creditor governments with that they
cannot threaten them with today? That they would abandon EMU and restore
their national currencies? How does this threaten creditor governments? That
they would default or some or all of their internally or externally held debt?
That option is equally available with or without a common currency, and the
costs to the defaulter are well-known.
If, for instance, the German government were to default on its
obligations towards creditors resident in Germany, this would be a strictly
German problem; at the very least the defaulting government would pay at the
next election.

If German government non-performance were at the expense of

creditors resident in other EMU countries, there should be no special
obligation for the non-German governments or for the supranational Community
agencies to compensate the losers.

One would of course expect the other

national, regional or supranational authorities and the non-German private
sector to impose the usual sanctions for foreign sovereign default: no further
credit; current transactions on a cash-in-advance basis only; attachment of
German official assets abroad etc.
If a national government debt default threatened to have adverse systemic
effects, say for the functioning of the community-wide financial system (or
for a key part of it like the banking system or the payments system), the
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damage can be limited (and serious damage avoided altogether) through
cooperative action by the national governments of the other Community
countries and the supranational bodies.

Such concerted systemic support need

not imply ,de jure or de facto, that the defaulting government is relieved of
its debt burden.

Consider for instance the case where a large chunk of the

defaulting national government's debt is held by that nation's banking system.
The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European Central Bank
(ECB) can play the "lender of last resort" function without "taking over" the
debt of the defaulting government and without raising the trend rate of growth
of the nominal money stock in the EC as a whole.
(12) Then there is the argument, that the fiscal norms are necessary to
render it impossible (or at any rate unlikely) that the new ESCB will
effectively be forced to monetize the budget deficits of countries without
fiscal discipline (Greece, Italy, Belgium, Ireland, Germany since
unification).

This is a special case of what was discussed under item (11).

The formal independence of the proposed ESCB and ECB vis

a vis

the

governments of the member states and the supranational authorities of the
European Communities is greater even than the formal independence of the
Bundesbank today. This holds for the appointment procedures for members of
the Executive Board and Governing Council and for the absolute ban on
overdrafts and other credit facilities with the ESCB and ECB for all EC,
national, regional, local and other public authorities. The ban on direct
purchases of government debt instruments by the ESCB is of course meaningless,
since "indirect" purchases (that is all purchases of debt instruments in the
secondary markets) are permitted.
The one major formal blot on the ESCB independence banner is the vague
and confusing verbiage in the Treaty concerning the powers of the Council of
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Ministers over the common external exchange rates.

Central bank independence

requires that the central bank be in charge of exchange rate policy.

If the

Council of Ministers were to have any powers over exchange rate determination
other than the ability to determine just the broadest possible features of the
exchange rate regime or system (fixed versus managed floating etc.), then the
independence of the ESCB would be seriously undermined.

Would the Council of

Ministers for instance have the authority to decide that the value of the ECU
should be fixed in terms of some basket of non-ECU currencies? If the answer
is "yes", the independence of the ESCB would be vacuous, unless the ESCB can
assume a leadership role vis

a vis

the central banks of the rest of the world,

more or less like the Bundesbank today within the EMS.
Note, however, that these limits on formal independence also apply in
spades to today's most independent national central bank, the Bundesbank.

It

had at most an advisory role in the process leading to the German government's
early support for EMU and a common currency.

It was completely ignored when

Chancellor Kohl opted for accelerated monetary unification of the two German
states and picked an exchange rate for the Vest German and East German marks.
Even if a central bank is formally completely independent of the
executive and legislative powers, it remains possible that its effective or
substantive independence is severely restricted by other agents (such as the

ministry of finance) who can maneuver it into a position where its domain of
choice is very limited. While this is in principle a possibility with the
ESCB, it will not be relevant in practice because after EMU any national
fiscal authority will be in a considerably weaker position vis
ESCB, than it is today vis

a vis

a vis

the new

its own national central bank. The ESCB will

remain the "leader" in the monetary-fiscal game of chicken (see Sargent [1986,
pp. 19-39]) at least until the supranational institutions of the EC are as
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strong relative to the ESCB as today's national Treasuries are in relation to
their national central banks
(13) By borrowing instead of covering its expenditures with current
taxes, the government engages, given the structure of taxation and transfer
payments in countries like the Netherlands, in redistribution from the younger
(working) current generations and from future generations to the current older

(retired) generations.

At given (intertemporal) relative prices, this boosts

aggregate consumption today, at the expense of current saving and therefore
(barring Keynesian miracles) at the expense of consumption tomorrow.

It is

important to realize that the government can, through its budgetary
instruments, achieve exactly the same redistribution and exactly the same
stimulus to current consumption with a balanced budget (see e.g. Buiter and
Kletzer [1992b]).

The government deficit and the government debt must be seen

in the context of the sum total of redistribution mechanisms between
generations.
Is it appropriate to set norms cooperatively in Europe for
intergenerational redistribution and for redistribution between creditors and
debtors (when intergenerational redistribution changes intertemporal relative
prices)? I am not aware that this has been the subject of intergovernmental
discussion at the EC level.

Indeed, there is little or no consensus on these

issues within national economies.

Even if cooperative determination of

intergenerational and debtor-creditor redistribution were on the EC menu, it
still remains a mystery why identical norms are prescribed for countries that
differ in private sector saving behavior, in investment behavior, in the
structure of government revenues and outlays, in demographic structure and in
749 other relevant respects.
(14) Finally, it should be clear that the budgetary norms are neither
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necessary, nor sufficient, nor useful for satisfying the other convergence
criteria in the Treaty of Maastricht (those with respect to inflation,
interest rates and exchange rates).
The conclusion is unavoidable that the primitive fiscal norms in the
laastricht Treaty are arbitrary and without any theoretical or practical
foundation.

Attempts to satisfy these criteria are likely to be damaging.

(3) What happens if the Netherlands tries to satisfy the fiscal norms of
laastricht?

In order to answer this question, I use a simple formula based on the
government budget identity (for details see the Appendix).

One possible

policy to achieve the debt norm post-haste will be not be considered further.
That is a capital levy on the holders of government debt, the legal face of
debt default.
The first question that can be answered easily with this formula is the
following.

Starting from an initial debt-GDP ratio, b0 , of 0.79 (seventy nine

percent of GDP), how long would it take the Netherlands to satisfy the
laastricht debt-GDP norm, b0* , of 0.6 (sixty percent of GDP) if it were to
* of
satisfy immediately and continuously the Maastricht deficit-GDP norm, d,

0.03 (three percent of GDP)?
In order to perform the calculations we need two further data: a
projection of the growth rate of nominal GDP, g, (assumed constant) and a
projection of the credit extended by the central bank to the government in the
future as a fraction of GDP, s.

I refer to this as seigniorage 1 3.

It is

assumed to be constant in the calculations that follow.
lib.at are reasonable values for the growth rate of nominal GDP and for
seigniorage? The average growth rate of nominal GDP for the Netherlands over
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the period 1984-1991 was 4.4 percent per annum (real GDP growth over the same
period was 2.3 percent per annum).

I shall therefore start with a 4 percent

annual growth rate for nominal GDP. As the results of the calculations are
less painful the higher the growth rate of nominal GDP, I shall repeat them
for g

= 5.0%

and g

= 6.0%.

I have estimated credit extended to the government by the Dutch central
bank somewhat crudely by subtracting total official foreign exchange reserves
from total central bank assets and differencing the resulting series. The
average value of s during the nine years 1982 to 1990 was a minuscule 0.11%
(just over one tenth of one percent of GDP). This value is used throughout,
but nothing much would change if it were doubled or set to zero.
The value oft, the number of years until the debt norm is satisfied is
given in Table 3.

Table 3
How long until the Netherlands satisfies the debt reference value?
b*

%GDP

bo
%GDP

d*
%GDP

s
%GDP

g
%p.a.

t
No. years

60.0
60.0
60.0

79.0
79.0
79.0

3.0
3.0
3.0

0.11
0.11
0.11

4.0
5.0
6.0

45.31
15.96

II)

Explanation:
* Reference value of public debt as a percentage of GDP.
b:
b0 : Actual value, at the beginning of 1992, of public debt as a
percentage of GDP.
*
d : Reference value of the government deficit as a percentage
of GDP.
s: Credit extended by the central bank to the government as a
percentage of GDP.
g: Annual percentage growth rate of nominal GDP.
t: Number of years until the reference value is achieved.
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With a 4% per annum growth rate of nominal GDP, the Netherlands would
never achieve the debt norm, even if it were to satisfy the deficit norm
forthwith.
72.25%.

In the long run the debt-GDP ratio would asymptotically approach

The growth rate of GDP must be at least 4.82% per annum if the debt

norm is to be achieved.
With a 5% per annum growth rate of nominal GDP, the debt norm can be

satisfied in a little over 45 years. With a 6% per annum growth rate of
nominal GDP the debt target is achieved in just under 16 years.

While it is

nice to know that the Netherlands will be ready in the year 2037 or 2008, it
would be a bit late to play a role in EMU. The second phase of EMU begins on
January 1, 1994. The third and last phase begins no earlier than 31 December
1996 and no later than January 1, 1999.
How small is the constant deficit (as a fraction of GDP) that will enable
the Netherlands to satisfy the debt norm on December 31, 1996 or on January 1,
1999? Table 4 provides some illustrative calculations. t * is the number of
years (5 or 7) until the Netherlands reaches the debt norm.

dis the

government deficit (as a percentage of GDP) required to reach the debt target.
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Table 4.
Hov large a deficit vill bring the Netherlands to the debt target on tille?
b*
%GDP

bo
%GDP

60.0
60.0
60.0
60.0
60.0
60.0
60.0
60.0

79.0
79.0
79.0
79.0
79.0
79.0
79.0
79.0

t*
s
No. years %GDP
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0

0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11

g
%p.a.
2.0
4.0
5.0
6.0

d
%GDP

2.0

-2.30
-0.92
-0.23
0.45
-1.22

4.0
5.0
6.0

0.84
1.53

0.16

Explanation (see also Table 3).
t * : Number of years until the debt reference value must be reached.
d: Required government deficit as a percentage of GDP.

The figures in Table 4 would be alarming if the Netherlands actually were
to feel obliged to satisfy the debt norm by the end of 1996 or the beginning
of 1999. With a 5 % annual growth rate of nominal GDP the Dutch government
would have to produce a surplus of 0.23% of GDP in order to wear the winner's
wreath of laurels at the beginning of 1997. If the target date is two years
later, a deficit of 0.84% of GDP is permitted. Both figures (fortunately) are
politically quite out of the question.
If the Netherlands were to succeed in getting inflation down to zero
while keeping the growth rate of real GDP at 2% per annum, the result would be
budgetary disaster.

If the debt norm is to be achieved by the end of 1996, a

budget surplus of 2.3% of GDP is required.

If D-day is the beginning of 1999,

a surplus of 1.22% of GDP will be required.

It is true that the lower rate of

inflation will be reflected in lower nominal interest rates.

The required

reduction in the primary deficit implied by the debt target is therefore
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smaller than the reduction in the deficit (which includes nominal interest
payments on the debt).

Much of the Dutch public debt has quite a long

maturity, however, and the reduction in the interest bill will therefore
initially be much smaller than the reduction in short nominal interest rates
times the value of the debt.
If the Netherlands were to try to satisfy the Maastricht debt norm, there
would have to be severe cuts in public spending or large increases in tax
rates.

This would also have to happen very swiftly. The associated costs

cannot be justified with commensurate benefits. The restructuring of public
expenditure and revenue in the Netherlands (which has been going on for years)
should continue as planned, without paying attention to the distractions of
Maastricht. Fear of sanctions need not deter the Dutch policy makers, since
the relevant clauses in the Treaty contain enough ambiguities to keep the
Council of Ministers occupied for the next 50 years.
It is obvious that countries like (in ascending order of seriousness)
Ireland, Belgium, Italy and Greece have serious budgetary problems.

In the

case of Greece, with its staggering "flow" problem, it is indeed hard to see
any economically feasible strategy for restoring budgetary equilibrium that
would command a political majority, unless a partial (de jure or de facto)
internal debt default is included in the package.

It may be called a "debt

consolidation", with an "interest moratorium", but the economic essence will
be that of a debt repudiation.
We do not need the Maastricht norms to tell us that a country is in
trouble, and by being so obviously infeasible in the case of the four
countries just mentioned, the Maastricht norms may actually weaken the case
for fiscal retrenchment where it is necessary.
It is regrettable that a serious Treaty runs the risk of having its
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overall credibility undermined because it contains a few arbitrary numbers.
The authors of the Delors Report, although also in the grip of the same
central bank fiscal-political prejudices, at least had the good sense not to
come up with precise figures for debt and deficit targets

1 4.

unfortunate that this restraint was abandoned in Maastricht.

It is very
It appears that

this was the political price that had to paid to keep the German negotiators
(looking over their shoulders at the Bundesbank) happy 1 s

Whatever the

reason, the price is too high.

(4) Conclusion.

Ve should only worry about the fiscal numerology of Maastricht if the
Netherlands (or any other country) were to take the two quantitative reference
values seriously and if budgetary policy were to be directed at the
achievement of the debt and deficit targets.

Fortunately there is no

compelling reason to shoot ourselves in the foot in this manner.
The benefits of a common currency are small (see Commission of the
European Communities [1990]).

Compared with a system of credibly fixed

exchange rates between national currencies, these benefits consist in the
saving of transaction costs associated with the replacement of several
national currencies by the ECU, and in the opportunity for competing somewhat
more effectively with the Yen and the US dollar as international reserve and
vehicle currencies. For individual member states the distribution of the
internal and external seigniorage of the ESCB-ECB is also important. The
costs and benefits of the non-monetary aspects of economic union (the single
market, economic aspects of the protocol on social policy) are independent of
the success or failure of monetary union.
The costs of a common currency are non-negligible. These consist mainly
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in the costs of any system of irrevocably fixed exchange rates in comparison
with a flexible exchange rate regime.

Each member state loses the opportunity

of pursuing an optimal nationally differentiated inflation policy.

Since the

EC members differ greatly in their ability to levy non-inflation taxes, this
restriction on the national fiscal policy arsenals may well be serious for
some countries.
In addition, the larger and less open member states lose a mechanism that
enables them to achieve necessary changes in international relative prices and
costs more rapidly and with less costs than would be possible through
variations in relative national nominal costs and prices.

As far as I know,

no-one has even demonstrated that the twelve member countries of the EC form
an "optimal currency area".
With a common currency, national exchange rate adjustments and nationally

differentiated monetary policy disappear from the stabilization arsenal.

The

importance of flexibility in the use of the remaining national stabilization
instrument, national fiscal policy, is correspondingly enhanced.

Debt and

deficit ceilings impair that flexibility and with it each member state's
ability to respond to nationally differentiated shocks. Futhermore, the debt
and deficit ceilings do nothing to ensure an appropriate aggregate
fiscal-monetary mix for the EC as a whole.
For a small, highly open economy like the Netherlands, which has had a
fixed exchange rate with the D-mark for many years, it will make very little
difference whether it adopts a common currency (the ECU) or holds on to its
national currency and maintains a fixed exchange rate with the ECU.

If the

price of a single European currency is the fiscal strait-jacket of Maastricht,
it would be better to forgo monetary union.
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Appendix
Some simple debt arithmetic.

The following symbols and definitions are used.

bis the ratio to GDP of

government debt held outside the central bank; Be is the stock of nominal
government debt held by the central bank; be is the ratio to GDP of government
debt held by the central bank;

o is the ratio to GDP of the government primary

(non-interest) deficit, excluding profits of the central bank appropriated by
the government;

o is the ratio to GDP of the government primary deficit,

including central bank profits; dis the ratio to GDP of the government
deficit, including interest payments; 0 is the ratio to GDP of central bank
profits appropriated by the government; i is the nominal interest rate on
government debt; R is the stock of official foreign exchange reserves; i * is
the interest rate on official foreign reserves; e is the nominal spot exchange
rate; c is the cost, as a fraction of GDP, of running the central bank; Y is
real GDP; pis the GDP deflator; g is the growth rate of nominal GDP; sis the
ratio to GDP of the change in credit extended to the government by the central
bank ("seigniorage"). Ve assume that the government appropriates all central
.

bank profits.
d

= o + i(b

It follows that:

s

_ Be

=~ ;

O_ . c

= 1b

*
i eR

+~ -

C ;

0

=0 -

+ be)

The government budget identity can be written as:
(Al)

.

b

= [i

- g] b +

-

o(t) -

0 + ibc - s

=-gb

+ d - s.

The solution to equation (Al) is
t
t
t
(A2)
b(t) = b(o)exp[-/ g(u)du] +/{exp[-/ g(u)du]}[d(v) - s(v)]dv
0

0

V

0 ;
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b(o)

=

b0 is the initial value of the ratio to GDP of government debt

(excluding debt held by the central bank).

If the growth rate of nominal

GDP is constant, equation (A2) simplifies to
t

(A3)

b(t)

=

b0 exp[-gt]

+

J {exp~g(t-v)]}[d(v) - s(v)]dv
0

The first question we can answer with the aid of equation (A3) is: if
from now on (now is t

the Netherlands were to stick to the Maastricht

= 0)

= d* = 0.03), then how long would it take until the
country would also satisfy the Maastricht norm for the debt (b(t) = b* = 0.6)?

norm for the deficit (d(v)

If seigniorage, s, is also constant, the answer to that question is given by
equation (A4).

(A4)

t

= -

The answer to the question as to how small should be the constant
deficit-GDP ratio, d, if the country has to satisfy the Maastricht norm for

* by a given target date, t *, is given by
the Government debt-GDP ratio, b,
equation (A5).
-gt

*

(A5)

*

b - b e
0

d = g[---~] + s

1 - e- gt

If the Maastricht norm is for the ratio to GDP of total general
government debt, including the debt held by the central bank, the arithmetic
-

-

is even easier. Let b be the total debt to GDP ratio, that is b
follows that
(A6)

or

b

= (i

- g)b

+

8

=b + be.

It
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b = -gb

(A7)

+

d

By settings= 0 in formulas (A4) and (A5), they can be made to apply to
total government debt.

In Table 3, the time interval until the debt norm is

reached will be slightly longer.

In Table 4, the deficit required to bring

the Netherlands to the debt target in a given period of time will be slightly
lower.

Equations (A6) and (A7) should not be allowed to obscure the fact that

borrowing from the central bank is effectively interest-free, since the
government appropriates the profits of the central bank. This becomes
apparent when we rewrite (A7) as
*
i eR + c
pl
Assume (as seems likely) that c is independent of be and ignore the small
*
income-from-international-reserves component ~yeR. Past general government

(A7')

b = - gb + i b +

o-

borrowing from the central bank instead of from the general public causes the
*

current government deficit, d = 6- ~YeR + c + ib , associated with any given
non-central bank primary deficit,

o,

and any given nominal interest rate, i , 16

to be smaller than it would otherwise have been.
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Footnotes
* I would like to thank Jacob de Haan, Cees Sterk, Flip de Kam en Jan
Jacobs for useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Responsibility
for errors of analysis and fact belongs to me alone.

1For the twelve EC members the average debt-GDP and deficit-GDP ratios
were as follows (source: EC).
General Gvt.
Gross Debt
7o GDP
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

45.5
50.3
53.3
56.4
59.1
60.0
61.5
61.0
60.3
60.3

General Gvt.
Net Borrowing
7o GDP
5.3
5.5
5.3
5.3
5.2
4.8
4.2
3.7
2.9
4.1

2In a stationary continuous time equilibrium, the constant ratio to GDP
of government debt held outside the central bank, b, the constant ratio of the
government deficit to GDP, d, the constant growth rate of nominal GDP, g and
the constant ratio to GDP of credit extended to the government by the central
bank, s, have the following relationship to each other: b = d ~ s
3 See Douglas Adams [1982] Life, the Universe and Everything. Some
experts argue that the correct answer is 54.
4It is important to distinguish between the market value of public sector
assets (on the assumption that they are transferred to private ownership) and
their "continuation value" (the present discounted value of their
contributions to the future primary (non-interest) surpluses of the government
should they remain government-owned). Both valuations can differ from their
social value.
5 In calculating the social rate of return on a public sector investment
project, one should of course allow for the costs associated with any
unavoidable distortionary financing of the project.
6 According to this theory the ratio of distortionary taxes to GDP
(sometimes referred to rather mysteriously as the "average marginal tax rate")
equals the sum of the average expected future value of the ratio of exhaustive
public spending to GDP and the permanent cost of servicing the current debt
(as a fraction of GDP). Let b be the public debt-GDP ratio, r the
instantaneous real rate of interest, n the instantaneous growth rate of real
GDP, 7 the ratio of exhaustive public spending to GDP and r the ratio of
distortionary tax receipts to GDP. For simplicity seigniorage is ignored .

.

The government budget identity can be written as b

= (r -

n)b

+

7 - r.

Define
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permanent public spending by
w
s
w
s
7P(t) = [/{exp[-/(r(u)-n(u))du]}ds]- 1/{exp[-/(r(u)-n(u))du]}7(s)ds and
t
t
t
t
permanent debt service by pP(t)b(t) where
w
s
1
p(t) = [/{exp[-/(r(u)-n(u))du]}ds]- . The theory implies that the optimal
t
t
value of r, r say, is given by
A

A

.

;(t) = 7P(t) + pP(t)b(t). It follows that;= O, that is r is (expected to
remain) constant or follows a random walk. The increase in the public

.

debt-GDP ratio is then given by b(t) = 7(t) - 7P(t) + [r(t)-n(t)-pP(t)]b(t).
If the current value of public spending equals its permanent value, and if the
excess of the instantaneous real interest rate over the instantaneous real
growth rate equals the excess of the long-run real interest rate over the
long-run real growth rate, then the public debt also follows a random walk.
7If there are persistent national differences in productivity growth
rates in the non-traded goods sectors, national inflation differences can
persist even with a common currency.
Sit is regrettable that the inflation convergence criterion rules out the
use of EMU by a member country to imporove its anti-inflationary reputation
and posture, just as the EMS is often argued to have done for countries like
Italy and France.
DSee e.g. Hamilton and Flavin (19861 and Buiter and Patel (1992]. In
Buiter and Kletzer [1992 a,b] we argue that this solvency criterion is too
strict in growing economies. We suggest that the present discounted value
that should ultimately stay non-positive is the real debt discounted at the
sum of the real interest rate and the real growth rate.
tOThe counterfactual to the borrowing is current tax financing using the
most broadly-based, least distortionary taxes. The effect on the interest
rates of other countries is most easily appreciated when there are credibly
fixed exchange rates or a common currency. It is also quite likely to be
true, however, if the exchange rate floats. Exchange rate risk need not be
affected appreciably by the choice between current taxes and borrowing.
11In Buiter and Kletzer (1991a,b], we develop this ar~ent at greater
length, both at a non-technical level (Buiter and Kletzer L1991b]) and at a
technical level (Buiter and Kletzer (1991a]).
12International mutual insurance against this form of sovereign risk
cannot be effective due to "moral hazard" problems.
1awe need the seigniorage projection only if the debt under consideration
is general government debt held outside the central bank. If the debt total
and the debt norm refer to general government debt including that held by the
central bank, no seigniorage projections are required. Tables 3 and 4 withs
equal to zero would give slightly higher values oft (the length of the period
until the debt norm is reached) and slightly lower values of d (the value of
the deficit required to reach the debt norm at a specific future date).
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14See Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (Delors
Committee)[1989].
15A Machiavellian interpretation of the Bundesbank's advocacy of
infeasible debt norms is that they are hoped and expected to delay EMU, and
especially the move to a common currency, until well into the next century and
perhaps to prevent it from occurring altogether. One motivating factor could
be the universal bureaucratic trait that no organization ever cooperates
enthusiastically and wholeheartedly with a venture that will result in its
demise. Second, German monetary officials must realize that they will never
be as influential in the ESCB and the ECD following EMU and with a common
currency, as they are today in the EMS with the D-Mark. By contrast, French
and Italian monetary officials can anticipate an increase in their influence
following EMU, after many frustrating years of subordination to the Bundesbank
in the EMS. This may account for their continued enthusiasm for EMU.
16The nominal interest rate on government debt, i, need not stay the same
under alternative financing modes. In a complete analysis, the extent to
which past monetary financing raises the current expected inflation rate and
the extent to which higher expected inflation raises the current nominal
interest rate must also be considered.

